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Sexual Abuse and Statistic Misuse: An Analysis of the Static-99R*
Gauging sexual offender recidivism is akin to looking in a crystal ball to
determine the future. The science simply cannot concretely say who will reoffend
and who will not. Now that the Adam Walsh Act has statutorily authorized
civil commitment for sexual offenders at the federal level, federal courts must
grapple with the question state courts have battled for decades: What evidence
shows whether an individual would, as a result of mental illness, have serious
difficulty refraining from reoffending?
This Comment explores one particular piece of evidence that courts have tended
to find persuasive: actuarial instruments, which are statistic mechanisms based
on historical data specific to each offender. Courts find comfort in such
instruments because of their objectivity. The numeric output provides courts with
something concrete to hold on to in an otherwise ambiguous field based largely
on expert opinions. A thorough analysis of the instrument—and the courts’
interpretation of it—reveals important flaws that must be considered given the
liberty interest at stake in civil commitment settings.
By exploring in depth an emblematic actuarial instrument, the Static-99R, as
well as judicial treatment of the instrument and the statutory language of the
Adam Walsh Act, this Comment seeks to expose important issues seemingly
overlooked by the courts. At present, the Static-99R as it is interpreted in judicial
opinions does not adequately speak to the statutory language of the Adam Walsh
Act. Simple, important considerations can remedy the problem and ensure that
courts are civilly committing individuals based on evidence of “serious difficulty
in refraining from reoffending” rather than just a demonstration of “likelihood”
of reoffending.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act (“AWA” or “Act”) to “protect children from
sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child
pornography, to promote Internet safety, and to honor the memory of Adam
Walsh and other child crime victims.”1 To achieve its purpose, the AWA created
a federal database for sexual offenders, strengthened enforcement and detection
of online crimes against children, and increased punishments for sexual crimes
against children.2
One provision of the Act garnered less media attention: the creation of
civil commitment for federal sexual offenders.3 Under this provision, the
government may seek civil commitment for an inmate at the end of his sentence
if the individual (1) has committed a past act of sexual violence; (2) has a serious
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder; and (3) as a result of that mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder, would have “serious difficulty in refraining from

1. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat. 587
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 34 U.S.C.).
2. Six-Year-Old Adam Walsh Is Abducted, HIST. (July 24, 2019), https://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/adam-walsh-is-abducted [https://perma.cc/278H-UC8E].
3. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2018).
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sexually violent conduct or child molestation.”4 In order for the government to
win a civil commitment hearing, the government must show by clear and
convincing evidence that each prong is met.5
The first and second prongs are not ordinarily at issue in these hearings;
by contrast, the third prong, concerning serious difficulty refraining from
reoffending, is much contested and presents “the most vexing issue.”6 Although
the advent of actuarial statistical instruments has improved assessments of
sexual reoffense when compared to unstructured clinical judgment, the actuarial
instruments have their own substantial limitations.7 An instrument frequently
invoked by the government and respondents to demonstrate sexual
dangerousness is the Static-99R.8 Though the instrument itself professes to
“demonstrate[] only moderate predictive accuracy,”9 courts have widely
adopted it to gauge sexual dangerousness.10 Most importantly, the Static-99R,
a revised edition of the Static-99, speaks to a likelihood of recidivism,11 but the Act
itself requires a finding of serious difficulty refraining from reoffending.12 Therefore,
reliance on the Static-99R is improper in AWA13 hearings: the statute requires
that an individual would have serious difficulty refraining, a distinctly different
inquiry than whether an individual is likely to reoffend.

4. Id. § 4247(a)(5)–(6).
5. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130–31 (2010). For an example of a commitment
order that details each prong, see United States v. Lange, 5:08-HC-2070, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
159498, at *24–35 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2012).
6. United States v. Carta (Carta II), 690 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012).
7. Anthony M. Tarescavage, Bruce M. Cappo & Yossef S. Ben-Porath, Assessment of Sex
Offenders with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality/Inventory–2–Restructured Form, 30 SEXUAL ABUSE
413, 414–15 (2018).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 752 F.3d 398, 409–11 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing two expert
witnesses’ usage of the most recent statistical instruments available, including the Static-99); United
States v. Bolander, 722 F.3d 199, 208–13 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing three expert witnesses’ usage of
the Static-99 as evidence of sexual dangerousness); United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir.
2012) (discussing three expert witnesses’ usage of different editions of the Static-99 instrument); Leslie
Helmus, R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, International Comparisons of the Validity of
Actuarial Risk Tools for Sexual Offenders, with a Focus on Static-99, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND
RESEARCH 55, 58 (Douglas P. Boer et al. eds., 2011). The Static-99R is one of four editions of the
same instrument. Sophie G. Reeves, James R.P. Ogloff & Melanie Simmons, The Predictive Validity of
the Static-99, Static 99R, and Static-2002/R: Which One to Use?, 30 SEXUAL ABUSE 887, 888–90 (2018).
The other three editions are the Static-99, the Static-2002, and the Static-2002R. Id.
9. AMY PHENIX ET AL., STATIC-99R CODING RULES 7 (2016), http://www.static99.org/
pdfdocs/Coding_manual_2016_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4DT-NSG9].
10. See, e.g., State v. Rosado, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369, 380 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (discussing the Static-99 as
a valid instrument for sexual offender civil commitment matters).
11. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2018); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 (2010).
13. As it is used in this paper, AWA refers to the civil commitment portion of the Act, codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 4248. In connection with this statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4247 contains information pertinent
to all civil commitment hearings, whether specifically for sexual offenders or not.
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The utility of the Static-99R is limited both by its scientific construction
and by the way courts interpret it. The sample population used to develop the
Static-99R is drawn from predominately European countries and is therefore
not directly applicable to a United States population.14 The Static-99R’s use at
various stages in civil commitment proceedings leaves courts with a false
impression of its ability to change over time.15 Although scientific studies have
found that different scorers will score one individual identically, the scores
assigned by forensic evaluators are often different, which indicates
inconsistency in its use.16 Lastly, courts often over-rely on the instrument,
trusting its score over important factors unique to each individual, such as
behavioral changes over time.17
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the AWA,
specifically the constitutional challenges that have led to its current
interpretation, and explores the legal evolution and application of each of the
prongs, with a focus on the “serious difficulty refraining” prong. Part II
critiques sexual offender assessments with a specific focus on the Static-99R18
and its limitations. Part III examines courts’ understanding and application of
the Static-99R in civil commitment hearings. Part IV, in response to common
criticisms, recommends much-needed changes to the instrument.
I. THE ADAM WALSH ACT
Among the multiple provisions of the AWA, the civil commitment
provision is little known but carries dramatic consequences for those to whom
it is applied. Apart from the AWA and the many state-level civil commitment
statutes for sexual offenders,19 there is no other state or federal law that allows

14. See infra Section II.D.
15. See infra Section III.A.
16. See infra Section III.B.
17. See infra Sections III.C, D.
18. The Static-99R is one of four iterations of what is sometimes referred to as the STATIC
suite. Amy Phenix & Douglas L. Epperson, Overview of the Development, Reliability, Validity, Scoring,
and Uses of the Static-99, Static-99R, Static-2002, and Static-2002R, in SEXUAL OFFENDING 437, 437–55
(Amy Phenix & Harry M. Hoberman eds., 2016); see R. Karl Hanson et al., What Sexual Recidivism
Rates Are Associated with Static-99R and Static-2002R Scores?, 28 SEXUAL ABUSE 218, 218–19 (2016)
[hereinafter Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates]. This paper discusses the Static-99R primarily because it
is presently the most widely used. However, some cases may reference the Static-99, the Static-2002,
or the Static-2002R since they were the current versions available at the time of the case. Because the
questions discussed in those instruments have not changed through the iterations of the instrument,
the distinction between the three versions is not relevant for the purposes of this Comment, except
where specifically noted.
19. As of 2015, “[t]wenty states (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin) and the District
of Columbia have enacted laws permitting the civil commitment of sexual offenders.” Civil
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for civil commitment based on a category of crime; there is no statute that
permits civil commitment for those who have committed murder, armed
robbery, fraud, or any other type of crime. Instead, civil commitment statutes
focus solely on severe mental illnesses that require continuing treatment, with
the purpose of ensuring that an individual does not represent a substantial
danger to himself20 or others.21 These individuals typically have multiple severe
and generally untreated mental illnesses.22 Therefore, a detailed overview of the
important provisions and issues that arise in a crime-specific civil commitment
context is necessary. This part will begin with an overview of the purpose of
the AWA and the transition from federal inmate to civilly committed
respondent to released party. Next, each of the three prongs will be discussed
in detail. Finally, this part will end by describing the different interpretations
of the troublesome “serious difficulty refraining” prong.
A.

Purpose and Process

The civil commitment portion of the AWA selects sexual offenders who
present a substantially greater threat than the “ordinary ‘dangerous but typical
recidivist.’”23 The government may, within the thirty days prior to the end of a
federal inmate’s sentence, seek to certify that individual as a “sexually dangerous
person.”24 The filing of intent to seek certification automatically acts as a stay
of release and affords the government time to prepare for a civil commitment
hearing.25 The government, the court, and the respondent may obtain
psychological or psychiatric evaluations of the respondent before the hearing.26
If the government shows by clear and convincing evidence that the
individual is sexually dangerous, the respondent is then committed to the
Attorney General’s custody.27 The statute requires annual reports to the court
from the “director of the facility in which a person is committed.”28 The facility
Commitment, ATSA (Oct. 2015), http://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-2 [https://perma.cc/4MWQ8XQU].
20. There is no statutory requirement that the AWA applies only to men because the statute uses
the word “person.” 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2018). However, it has not been applied to women nor has
any court addressed this anomaly.
21. See, e.g., id. § 4246.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Henley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 503, 505 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (describing that
the combination of severe antisocial personality disorder and severe borderline personality disorder
give the “synergistic effect” of the respondent’s combined diagnosis and explaining that personality
disorders would not generally qualify for civil commitment).
23. United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534
U.S. 407, 413 (2002)).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).
25. Id.
26. Id. §§ 4247(b), 4248(b).
27. Id. § 4248(d).
28. Id. § 4247(e)(1)(B). The Act requires the “director of the facility in which a person is
committed” to provide a summary of the respondent’s commitment, the respondent’s treatment since
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director is also required to inform the respondent about any applicable
rehabilitation programs offered at that facility.29
The AWA implicates a critical liberty interest: the right to be free from
confinement. Because the statutory language requires that the government
submit a certificate of dangerousness within the last month before the
individual is scheduled for release, some have argued that the Act violates an
individual’s due process rights.30 Furthermore, civil commitment may be
indefinite; neither the statute nor case law provides any maximum length of
time for commitment.31 There are two pathways to release: (1) recommendation
by the facility or (2) petition by the respondent.32 Because the legislators
recognized the gravity of the liberty interest at stake and the infrequency with
which the facility recommends release, a respondent may petition the court for
a release hearing every six months.33 The court must grant a discharge hearing
if the motion for the discharge hearing “contains sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for discharge that is plausible on its face.”34
The court must release the respondent if it finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the respondent either “will not be sexually dangerous to others if
released unconditionally”35 or that “he will not be sexually dangerous to others
if released under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological
care or treatment.”36
B.

Constitutional Challenges and the Limited Guidance from the Supreme Court

Soon after the Act was put into place, respondents began attacking the Act
on a myriad of grounds, including the evidentiary standard, procedural due
process, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the right to a trial by jury, lack
of adequate notice, vagueness, and equal protection.37 Early judicial decisions at
the district court level declared the statute unconstitutional.38 Ultimately,
though, the Supreme Court reversed these decisions in the only AWA case it
the last report, any changes to the respondent’s physical and mental health diagnoses, and
recommendations about the necessity of continued commitment. Id.
29. Id. § 4247(e)(2).
30. See generally United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 329–34 (D. Mass. 2007) (detailing
multiple due process considerations).
31. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 174 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing that
upholding the Act allows the government the “power to exercise indefinite civil control over” a
respondent).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e).
33. See id. § 4247(h).
34. United States v. Maclaren, 866 F.3d 212, 218 (4th Cir. 2017).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e)(1).
36. Id. § 4248(e)(2).
37. See generally United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 329–34 (D. Mass. 2007) (detailing
multiple due process considerations).
38. See Timms v. Johns, 700 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774 (E.D.N.C. 2010).

98 N.C. L .REV. 933 (2020)

2020]

SEXUAL ABUSE & STATISTIC MISUSE

939

has heard, United States v. Comstock.39 Despite the plethora of due process
challenges, both in Comstock itself and in other cases, the Comstock decision
explicitly focused only on the congressional authority to enact the AWA under
the Necessary and Proper Clause.40 The Court plainly refused to decide any due
process challenges.41
After upholding the statute’s validity under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the Court reiterated that it decided no due process questions, stating
that “[w]e do not reach or decide any claim that the statute or its application
denies equal protection of the laws, procedural or substantive due process, or
any other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondents are free to pursue
those claims on remand, and any others they have preserved.”42
To date, the Supreme Court has yet to hear an AWA case on due process
grounds despite the fact that the Act clearly implicates due process concerns.
While it is settled law that the AWA is “civil and not criminal in nature,” courts
recognize that AWA commitments are different from ordinary civil suits and
provide certain additional protections.43 Those protections have evolved to
include the right to confront witnesses, the right to counsel, and a heightened
burden of proof from the ordinary civil standard of preponderance of the
evidence.44 These rights are afforded because of the gravity of the liberty
interest at stake.45 Such factors appear to mimic the rights of those who have
been charged with a crime, which may continue to blur the line between civil
and criminal.
C.

AWA’s Three Prongs
1. Past Sexual Offense

The first prong of the AWA requires that the individual has “engaged or
attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation.”46 Often,
this is a clear-cut analysis. Generally, the government seeks to commit
individuals who have either confessed to or been convicted of past acts of sexual
violence or child molestation.47 In 2010, at the time of the Comstock oral

39. 560 U.S. 126, 150 (2010).
40. Id. at 132–33 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
41. Id. at 133.
42. Id. at 149–50.
43. United States v. Searcy, 880 F.3d 116, 125 (4th Cir. 2018) (recognizing the significant liberty
interest at stake).
44. Id. at 125.
45. Id.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (2018).
47. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–25, United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010) (No.
08-1224) [hereinafter Comstock Oral Argument] (describing that out of the 103 persons certified as
sexually dangerous, eighty-three were most recently in prison for sexual crimes, and the remaining
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argument, the federal Bureau of Prisons had found that 15,000 individuals met
the factual predicate of having engaged in a crime of sexual violence and only
sought commitment for 105 of them.48 Justice Stevens quickly noted in oral
argument for Comstock that having prior sexual convictions is not a necessary
factual prerequisite to proving this element.49
For those currently serving a sentence for a conviction of a crime of sexual
violence or child molestation, this prong is straightforward. For those serving a
sentence for a nonsexual crime, this prong is more complex. Because the AWA
aims to protect the public from the most dangerous of sexual offenders,50 civilly
committing someone who is presently serving a sentence for a nonsexual crime,
but has a past conviction of violence, presents a paradox.51
A third category of respondents may exist: those who have never been
convicted of sexual violence or child molestation.52 Under the letter of the law,
the government could seek to commit an inmate it had reason to believe was
sexually dangerous even if that individual did not have any past convictions for
sexually related crimes.53 This raises a procedural due process issue: a
respondent may be committed for an alleged crime if the government can meet
a clear and convincing standard, possibly in violation of well-settled
constitutional criminal law requiring the government to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.54
2. Mental Illness
The second prong requires the government to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual “suffers from a serious mental illness,
twenty had past histories of sexual offending; those twenty individuals were released at the ordinary
termination of their sentence).
48. Id. at 25.
49. Id. at 24–25.
50. United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 2014).
51. This category represents more uncertainty than clarity. There are many reasons why someone
may be serving a present sentence for a nonsexual crime, such as a probation violation or the
commission of an ordinary violent crime. This category becomes much more complex in circumstances
where the present reason for incarceration may have had a sexual component but the prosecutor decided
not to pursue that particular line of evidence or charge. The second category is meant to reference
circumstances where the reason the individual is presently incarcerated does not involve an additional
sexual component.
52. This is in contrast to category two, where at some point in the individual’s life they did have
a conviction for a crime of sexual violence or child molestation but were not currently serving a sentence
for such a crime.
53. Comstock Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 24–25.
54. There is no case to date that directly addresses this issue. However, especially in the context
of plea bargaining, it is feasible that the government would seek to civilly commit an individual who
pled down from a higher offense. That person would have conceded guilt to a lesser offense that might
not rise to the level of sexual violence or child molestation, but the government may have sufficient
evidence to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the individual had, in fact, committed
a higher-level offense.
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abnormality, or disorder.”55 Commonly in AWA cases these are diagnoses of
pedophilia (or pedophilic disorder),56 antisocial personality disorder, alcohol
and substance abuse, and paraphilia not-otherwise-specified.57
Prior to a commitment hearing, the statute permits the court, the
government, the defendant, or all of the above to order a psychological
evaluation of the respondent.58 The report will include all the diagnoses that the
evaluator, generally a psychologist or a psychiatrist, believes the respondent has;
often multiple evaluations presented by opposing parties will volunteer
conflicting opinions.59 Furthermore, “the statutory definition of ‘serious mental
illness’ is not limited to either the consensus of the medical community or to
maladies identified in the [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual],” so courts may
find diagnoses not recognized in scientific literature or by the scientific
community at large.60 As stated in a state law case with similar requirements,
“the term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any talismanic significance.”61 The court
is ultimately tasked with deciding if the respondent has any mental illness and,
if so, what mental illness.
In United States v. Wooden,62 the respondent, Wooden, petitioned the court
for release in 2016 after he was committed in 2014.63 At the hearing, four experts
testified—two for the respondent and two for the government.64 Of the four
experts, three diagnosed the respondent with pedophilia based on past historical
data.65 Two experts also diagnosed the respondent with Intellectual Deficit
Disorder (“IDD”).66 Ultimately, the court had to decide which disorders to
assign to the respondent. The court found that “IDD is a better explanation for

55. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2018).
56. Because these diagnoses are provided by psychologists who typically adhere to the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual (“DSM”) definitions of mental illnesses, the names for illnesses may change as
the DSM changes names and diagnostic criteria. The DSM is considered by the health community to
be the authoritative source of diagnostic criteria for mental health conditions.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 741 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing diagnoses of
pedophilic disorder and antisocial personality disorder and alluding to substance abuse); United States
v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 38–41 (1st Cir. 2010) (discussing at length paraphilia not-otherwise-specified
and the legal validity of the diagnosis). Paraphilia not-otherwise-specified is a catchall for deviant
sexual behaviors, with a loose definition that evolves with every iteration of the DSM.
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(b), 4248(b); infra Part II.
59. See, e.g., United States. v. Wooden (Wooden II), 887 F.3d 591, 597–99 (4th Cir. 2018).
60. Carta II, 690 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012). In practice, experts can diagnose and testify that
individuals have psychological conditions not recognized in the DSM, and the court adopts whichever
diagnosis it finds most supported by the evidence.
61. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (describing the ambiguity as to what might
constitute a serious mental illness or abnormality).
62. 887 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2018).
63. Id. at 594.
64. Id. at 597–98.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Mr. Wooden’s past criminal behavior than Pedophilic Disorder.”67 The court
then found that IDD was not a qualifying mental disease, abnormality, or
disorder and ordered Wooden to be released from civil commitment because he
no longer met the requirements for commitment.68 This case marks the first
time that a court found that a mental illness, abnormality, or disorder did not
meet the criteria for continued commitment. Such a recognition is an
important, positive shift in AWA cases because it indicates that courts can
discern that not all mental illnesses—whether recognized by the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (“DSM”) or not—are related to sexual dangerousness.
3. Serious Difficulty
Courts struggle the most in determining whether the serious difficulty
prong is met and often look to the Static-99R for answers.69 To commit an
individual, the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that,
as a result of the mental illness, abnormality, or disorder, the individual “would
have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child
molestation if released.”70 Precedent affecting this prong predates the AWA
because the statutory language is nearly identical to existing state law civil
commitment statutes, such as the Kansas statute at issue in two U.S. Supreme
Court cases.71
In Kansas v. Hendricks,72 the Supreme Court had to determine the
constitutionality of a sexual offender civil commitment statutory scheme.73 The
Court upheld the statute because it not only asked whether or not an individual
might be dangerous but linked that dangerousness to an additional
component—mental illness.74 Specifically, Hendricks stated that the statute
“requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the
existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.”75
Perhaps unintentionally, the Court introduced an important word in this ruling
that may have turned a seemingly one-factor test into a two-factor test.76 The
Court stated that the respondent conceded that he “cannot ‘control the urge’ to
molest children. This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a
67. Id. at 599.
68. Id. at 610 (“Wooden does not suffer from a serious mental illness, disease, or abnormality,
and . . . therefore is not sexually dangerous.”).
69. Carta II, 690 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2018).
71. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
72. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
73. Id. at 350.
74. Id. at 358.
75. Id. at 358.
76. Crane, 534 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from
other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively
through criminal proceedings.”77 The term “volitional” has spurred much
discussion,78 and the subsequent cases attempting to resolve the confusion have
tangled the web further rather than providing answers.
Five years later, the Supreme Court was asked to clarify Hendricks in
Kansas v. Crane.79 In Crane, the respondent argued that Hendricks required a
finding of a total lack of control, while Kansas essentially argued that no lack of
control finding was necessary.80 Crane argued that some diagnoses are purely
emotional disorders and do not relate to a volitional control issue; essentially,
someone who has a mental illness unrelated to actions cannot constitutionally
be shown to have serious difficulty refraining from reoffending.81 In its opinion,
the Court turned to the issue of an “emotional” disorder versus a “volitional”
one, acknowledging that Hendricks was limited to a volitional issue.82 The Court
then explicitly refused to resolve the question, stating that “[t]he Court in
Hendricks had no occasion to consider whether confinement based solely on
‘emotional’ abnormality would be constitutional, and we likewise have no
occasion to do so in the present case.”83
Justice Scalia’s strongly worded dissent in Crane indicated that the Court
added an additional element to civil commitment: “a separate finding of
inability to control behavior.”84 He specified that
[t]oday’s opinion says that the Constitution requires the addition of a
[new] finding: . . . that the subject suffers from an inability to control
behavior—not utter inability and not even inability in a particular
constant degree, but rather inability in a degree that will vary “in light
of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and
the severity of the mental abnormality itself.”85
He added the prediction that “[u]nfortunately, it gives trial courts, in future
cases under the many commitment statutes similar to Kansas’s [sexual offender

77. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
78. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50–51, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 00-957)
[hereinafter Crane Oral Argument]. The oral argument focused on psychological diagnoses that tend
to indicate complete volitional control but represent a distorted reality, with one Justice likening the
question to an individual who, due to delusions, thinks all people are rocks but is completely in control
of his behavior. Id. at 50. The oral argument focused entirely on the different categories of diagnoses,
including volitional, emotional, intellectual, and personality diagnoses. See id. at 3.
79. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
80. Id. at 411–13.
81. Crane Oral Argument, supra note 78, at 50–51; see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
82. Crane, 534 U.S. at 415.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
85. Id. at 423 (quoting the majority opinion).
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civil commitment statute], not a clue as to how they are supposed to charge the
jury!”86
The aftermath of Crane has led to considerable confusion and differing
outcomes. Likely in an effort to highlight the complexity, the Second Circuit
in Richard S. v. Carpinello87 detailed the different nuanced interpretations of the
prong.88 The court, attempting to determine what the standard actually
required, identified that a majority of states found that Crane did not require an
additional finding of volitional control issues, but notably indicated that states
required a volitional control component.89
Ambiguous terminology that conflates emotional and volitional issues
leads to confused legal opinions. A careful reading of many of the cases
referenced in Richard S. reveals that, although an additional factor was not
created, the court nonetheless found a volitional control issue.90 Alternatively,
the courts conflate emotional and volitional impairments, with one court stating
that “[a] person with an emotional impairment might be subject to fits of anger
or meanness so extreme that he cannot control his actions.”91 Importantly, the
Fourth Circuit, where many of these cases are heard,92 has found that “[t]he
‘serious difficulty’ prong of [the AWA] refers to the degree of the person’s
‘volitional impairment,’ which impacts the person’s ability to refrain from
acting upon his deviant sexual interests.”93 Judges are not psychologists, and
they often acknowledge that they are not equipped to fully understand nuanced
diagnoses and how different conditions interface with dangerousness.94

86. Id. (emphasis omitted).
87. 589 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2009).
88. For a thorough description of how various jurisdictions interpret this requirement, see id. at
83–84.
89. Id. at 82–83.
90. See, e.g., Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2005) (“By concluding that Laxton has
a mental disorder and that his mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he will engage in
acts of sexual violence, the court explained, the jury had to conclude that Laxton’s mental disorder
involved serious difficulty to him in controlling his behavior.”).
91. In re W.Z., 773 A.2d 97, 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
92. The overwhelming majority of AWA cases are heard in the Fourth Circuit because the only
treatment facility for civilly committed sexual offenders is located in Butner, North Carolina. Lifelong
Pedophile and Violent Offender Committed to Federal Custody as a Sexually Dangerous Person, U.S. DEP’T
JUST.: U.S. ATTY’S OFF. E. DISTRICT N.C. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usaoednc/pr/lifelong-pedophile-and-violent-offender-committed-federal-custody-sexually-dangerous
[https://perma.cc/4FAT-GYC7] (“The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of
North Carolina litigates all Adam Walsh Act cases for the entire country. All sexually dangerous
persons who are committed to federal custody are housed in a federal facility in that district, where
intensive, residential treatment is offered to them.”).
93. United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 463 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 358 (1997)).
94. See Crane Oral Argument, supra note 78, at 48 (“We’re not psychiatrists or psychologists
either. That’s . . . part of the problem . . . .”).
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II. SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS OF SEXUAL OFFENDER ASSESSMENT
METHODS
Courts hear evidence for each of the three prongs of the AWA and rely
heavily on expert testimony about psychologists’ clinical impressions of the
individual.95 One important tool that clinicians rely on for their testimony and
reports to the court is risk assessments of sexual offenders.96 These reports are
thoroughly developed and often include tools like the Static-99R.97 Although
the Static-99R is not more predictive than other actuarial tools, it is the most
researched and easily used by “diverse professionals using commonly available
information” such as past criminal history and the individual’s age.98 Because
the Static-99R is the primary tool used in court reports and has been widely
researched, it will be the focus of this Comment as illustrative of other similar
tools.
This part will begin by explaining the major components of a sexual
offender report and will then discuss the Static-99R in detail, culminating with
an analysis of the instrument’s limitations.
A.

The Forensic Sexual Offender Risk Assessment Reports

When considering an individual for civil commitment, the court must
order a psychological evaluation of that individual, which culminates in a report
to the court.99 The “[r]isk assessment informs all participants in the criminal
justice system, from police to treatment providers, of the future likelihood of
certain individuals to cause harm.”100 The lengthy evaluation may vary from one
evaluator to another, but there are generally accepted components and
practices.101 A well-written report will “clearly demonstrate how conclusions

95. For an example, see Order at 22, United States v. Yates, No. 5:08-HC-02073-BR (E.D.N.C.
Mar. 2, 2018), ECF No. 168 [hereinafter Yates Order].
96. Kevin Baldwin, Sex Offender Risk Assessment, in SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING INITIATIVE 133, 136–37 (2017), https://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/
pdfs/SOMAPI_Full%20Report.pdf [perma.cc/G2MX-ZJZ2 (discussing unstructured clinical
judgment as the first generation of sexual offender assessment methodology and describing
advancements in expert reporting).
97. For a thorough summary of different evaluators’ reports, see Yates Order, supra note 95, at 22
n.3.
98. R. Karl Hanson et al., Communicating the Results of Criterion Referenced Prediction Measures: Risk
Categories for the Static-99R and Static-2002R Sexual Offender Risk Assessment Tools, 29 PSYCHOL.
ASSESSMENT 582, 584 (2016) [hereinafter Hanson et al., Risk Categories].
99. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) (2018).
100. Sex Offender Risk Assessment, ATSA (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.atsa.com/pdfs/
SexOffenderRiskAssessmentBriefWithBibliography2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/6B2Y-P4BF].
101. See Anita Schlank, Saprina Matheny & Jessica Schilling, Overview of Assessment of Sexual
Offenders, in SEXUAL OFFENDING, supra note 18, at 247, 247.
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were drawn and . . . highlight any inconsistencies in the data or limitations to
the conclusions.”102
Sexual offender evaluations may serve different purposes and different
portions may be appropriate only for certain populations; an evaluation for child
custody situations clearly will contain different material than one for civil
commitment purposes.103 Because over twenty states have enacted civil
commitment statutes in addition to the AWA,104 the evaluator must ensure that
his or her report speaks specifically to the language of the statute under which
the respondent falls and apply the appropriate burden of proof, which varies by
statute.105
A typical civil commitment evaluation has three parts: (1) a clinical
diagnosis and opinion; (2) implementation and integration of statistical
instruments (like the Static-99R) and other scientific research; and (3) a
determination of present dangerousness.106 Generally, the first portion consists
of clinical judgment determinations, which are based on a clinician’s
professional experience.107 The evaluator conducts a clinical interview where the
sexual offender is informed about the purpose of the interview and told that any
information the offender offers in the interview will not be treated as
confidential.108
The next portion of the evaluation attempts to determine a likelihood of
reoffense by looking at many factors, including general rates of reoffense,
combined results of actuarial instruments, risk factors associated with reoffense,

102. Id. at 247–48.
103. See id. at 248.
104. Civil Commitment, supra note 19.
105. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2018) (requiring a demonstration of “serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation”), with WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.09.020(18) (2019) (defining a sexually violent predator for civil commitment purposes as someone
who would be “likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence”).
106. See Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders: A
Survey of Experts, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE 425, 430 (2007); Schlank et al., supra note 101, at 248. The purpose
of the interview is to understand the individual’s sexual history, so the psychologist will attempt to
discern information such as the individual’s perception and account of his past sexual offenses. See id.
at 249. Supplemented by the individual’s factual and criminal record, the evaluator will then conduct
assessments for a wide array of diagnoses, such as pedophilia, substance abuse, antisocial personality
disorder, anxiety, depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and intellectual deficits. See id.
at 249–53.
107. See Risk Assessment, ATSA, http://www.atsa.com/risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/85GCRGW2].
108. Harry M. Hoberman & Rebecca L. Jackson, Forensic Evaluations of Sexual Offenders: Principles
and Practices for Almost All Sexual Offender Appraisals, in SEXUAL OFFENDING, supra note 18, at 353,
367.
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clinical judgment, and any relevant special considerations.109 Often, one or more
common statistical instruments are used.110
Finally, the evaluator will write a report detailing the diagnoses and risk
results of the evaluation as well as a recommendation to the court as to whether
the individual meets the criteria for civil commitment.111 A well-written report
incorporates, but does not solely rely on, clinical judgment and primarily refers
to scientifically validated sources to best explain the conclusions reached by the
evaluator.112
B.

Instrument Types and Statistic Viability

An actuarial risk instrument establishes risk predictions based only on
known, factual information, such as the number of past convictions or the
offender’s age.113 It is devoid of clinical judgment.114 Modern evaluators praise
these instruments for their improved accuracy over clinical judgment, their
inter-user reliability, and their ability to be researched and evaluated—a distinct
benefit over the unstructured clinical judgment approach.115
Multiple statistical instruments gauge sexual offender recidivism with
approximately equal accuracy when looking at population-level risk factors and
rates of recidivism.116 However, when these instruments are applied to an

109. See id. at 384.
110. Id. Some frequent examples include the MnSOST-R, SVR-20, Rapid Risk Assessment for
Sexual Offense Recidivism (“RRASOR”), and Static-99. Baldwin, supra note 96, at 139–40.
111. For a thorough discussion about the report writing process, see Hoberman & Jackson, supra
note 108, at 386–89.
112. See Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, ATSA (Aug. 17, 2010),
https://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-sexually-violent-predators
[https://perma.cc/ZVB83WCQ].
113. Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Actuarial Risk Assessment Models: A Review of Critical Issues Related to
Violence and Sex-Offender Recidivism Assessments, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 438, 438 (2000).
114. Id.
115. Helmus et al., supra note 8, at 58; Sreenivasan et al., supra note 113, at 438.
116. Howard E. Barbaree, Calvin M. Langton & Edward J. Peacock, Different Actuarial Risk
Measures Produce Different Risk Rankings for Sexual Offenders, 18 SEXUAL ABUSE 423, 423–24 (2006)
[hereinafter Barbaree et al., Different Actuarial Risk Measures]. For a summary of the comparative
predictive accuracy of actuarial instruments, see Dale Arnold & Marianne Davis, Risk Factors and Risk
Assessments for Sexual Offense Recidivism, in SEXUAL OFFENDING, supra note 18, at 417, 429. Many
studies have explored the comparative accuracy of common static instruments including but not limited
to the Static-99, RRASOR, SACJ-Min, Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (“SORAG”), and Risk
Matrix 2000. See generally Howard E. Barbaree et al., Evaluating the Predictive Accuracy of Six Risk
Assessment Instruments for Adult Sex Offenders, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 490, 490 (2001) (comparing
multiple sexual offender actuarial instruments); R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk
Assessments for Sex Offenders: A Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 119
(2000) (describing that the predictive accuracy of three actuarial instruments, the RRASOR, SACJMin, and Static-99, were all approximately equal); Drew A. Kingston et al., Long-Term Predictive
Validity of the Risk Matrix 2000: A Comparison with the Static-99 and the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide,
20 SEXUAL ABUSE 466, 466 (2008) (comparing the predictive accuracy of the Static-99, SORAG, and
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individual sexual offender, they may incorrectly predict whether that offender
is likely to recidivate.117 In fact, one study found that when comparing the five
most common instruments, 55% of the study participants were classified as
“high risk” in at least one of the instruments, but only 3% of the participants
were classified as high risk in all five instruments.118 The challenge for an
evaluator is to determine which instrument they believe paints the most correct
image of the offender—a determination that relies heavily on clinical judgment,
the factor that actuarial instruments were designed to remove.
In contrast to actuarial instruments, a dynamic assessment focuses on
factors likely to change with time, such as progress in treatment, self-regulation,
and deviant sexual interest.119 Dynamic instruments, though often used for
general crime assessments, are a newer creation in the field of sexual offender
assessments and, as such, are not as well researched.120 Preliminary studies show
promise for certain dynamic instruments and indicate that, when dynamic
instruments are combined with an actuarial risk instrument, they better predict
recidivism risk than either tool alone.121
C.

The Static-99 and Its Progeny

Although there are over a dozen actuarial risk assessments created
specifically for determining likelihood of sexual offender recidivism, by far the
most prominent, most researched, and most common is the Static-99R.122
Because the instrument is short and concise, it is available at appendix A to
assist the reader in understanding the instrument.123
The Static-99R gauges an individual’s relative risk rather than absolute
risk.124 Risk measures how likely a certain outcome is to occur based on certain
exposures. Relative risk measures how much more likely an exposed group is to
have a certain outcome than an unexposed group. For instance, we may want to
know how much more likely smokers are than nonsmokers to develop lung
cancer. The “exposed” group would encompass those who have smoked, and the
Risk Matrix 2000, finding the three approximately equal with the SORAG having a slightly higher
predictive accuracy).
117. Barbaree et al., Different Actuarial Measures, supra note 116, at 437.
118. Id.
119. Gwenda M. Willis, Tony Ward & Jill S. Levenson, The Good Lives Model (GLM): An
Evaluation of GLM Operationalization in North American Treatment Programs, 26 SEXUAL ABUSE 58, 60
(2014).
120. See Reinhard Eher et al., Dynamic Risk Assessment in Sexual Offenders Using STABLE-2000 and
the STABLE-2007: An Investigation of Predictive and Incremental Validity, 24 SEXUAL ABUSE 5, 6 (2012).
121. Robert J. McGrath, Michael P. Lasher & Georgia F. Cumming, The Sex Offender Treatment
Intervention and Progress Scale (SOTIPS): Psychometric Properties and Incremental Predictive Validity with
Static-99R, 24 SEXUAL ABUSE 431, 443 (2012).
122. Helmus et al., supra note 8, at 58.
123. Infra Appendix A.
124. See Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates, supra note 18, at 219.

98 N.C. L .REV. 933 (2020)

2020]

SEXUAL ABUSE & STATISTIC MISUSE

949

“unexposed” group would be those who have never smoked. After finding the
risk rates for each group, we would calculate the relative risk (sometimes called
risk ratio) to determine how much more likely the exposed group would be to
develop lung cancer than the unexposed group. For another example, we know
that we always risk getting in a car crash when traveling in a car. We also know
that someone who is driving while intoxicated is more likely to get in a car crash
than someone who is sober. We would look at the risk of the exposed group
(drunk drivers) and the unexposed group (non-drunk drivers) to determine each
group’s risk of incurring a certain outcome (car crashes). The relative risk
measures how much more likely it is that a drunk driver would be in a car crash
than an ordinary person. Similarly, the Static-99R does not answer how likely
anyone is to commit a crime of sexual violence but instead how much more
likely one group of sexual offenders is to recidivate than another group of sexual
offenders.125 The mechanism used to determine recidivism rate is the
individual’s score on the actuarial instrument and the most current statistical
tables of recidivism.126
The protective factors (factors that can decrease the likelihood of
recidivism) of the Static-99R include advanced age at release, having lived with
a lover for at least two years, and having exclusively female victims.127
Conversely, factors identified as likely to increase rates of recidivism include
current and prior convictions and charges for both sexual and nonsexual
violence, victims who are related (incest) or who are strangers (not known and
also not related), and the inclusion of male victims.128 Because it is an actuarial
instrument, the Static-99R does not include any dynamic factors; the score
someone receives when they enter prison will not change except for the age
factor.
The final scores range from -3 to 13, and relative risk increases as the score
increases.129 A score of -3 or -2 indicates a low risk for reoffense (Level I); a
score of -1 or 0 indicates below-average risk of reoffense (Level II); a score of
1–3 indicates an average risk of reoffense (Level III); a score of 4 or 5 indicates
an above-average risk of reoffense (Level IVa); and a score of 6+ indicates a
well-above-average risk of reoffense (Level IVb).130 Notably, the creators of the
Static-99R acknowledge in other scholarship that “[t]here are no universal
standards for labeling relative or absolute likelihoods of adverse events . . . . A
10% chance of a hurricane is high risk; a 10% chance of rain is not.”131
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 220.
PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hanson et al., Risk Categories, supra note 98, at 583 (citation omitted).
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With a basic understanding of the instrument’s design in place, this
Comment will now analyze the accuracy and implementation of the Static-99R.
D.

Accuracy and Sample Population

The primary statistic used to gauge the accuracy of both actuarial and
dynamic instruments is the derivative of the Receiver Operating
Characteristics, called the Area Under the Curve (“AUC”).132 This statistic
compares how often false positives occur compared with true positives at each
predictive point.133 It is used with binary groups to determine how correctly a
test can determine who is “in” and who is “out.”134 For sexual offenders, the “in”
group is those who recidivate, and the “out” group is those who do not
recidivate.135 Metrics for an AUC range from 0.5 to 1.0, with 1.0 representing a
perfect classification system that can always classify who is in the “in” group
correctly and who is in the “out” group correctly.136 An output of 0.5 indicates
that the instrument is no better at predicting who falls in what group than
random guessing.137
Despite the moderate accuracy of the Static-99R, courts still routinely use
the instrument in civil commitment settings without adequately contextualizing
the instrument’s professed accuracy. In fact, only in four AWA cases has a court
described the instrument as having “moderate predictive accuracy,”138 even
though the Static-99R itself professes “moderate predictive accuracy,”139 which
is validated in other studies revealing an AUC of 0.69–0.70.140 When combined
with other assessments, particularly dynamic ones, the AUC increases to 0.80–
0.83.141 The sample population used to develop the original Static-99 consisted
of only 1086 sexual offenders, but the risk tables were updated with new
information from a sample consisting of 6706 offenders from seventeen
132. See Roos Colman, Interpretation of the AUC, DATASCIENCE+ (Sept. 15, 2018, 3:42 PM),
https://datascienceplus.com/interpretation-of-the-auc/ [https://perma.cc/AU89-GHDJ].
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See Hanson et al., Risk Categories, supra note 98, at 587.
136. See ROC Curves and Area Under the Curve Explained, DATA SCH. (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://www.dataschool.io/roc-curves-and-auc-explained/ [https://perma.cc/D2SA-2UEW].
137. Id.
138. A search on Lexis Advance on December 26, 2019 for “moderate predictive accuracy” returned
thirty-two cases total that use the term “moderate predictive accuracy.” Of those, seven cases were
federal cases. Of those seven, only four were AWA cases. See United States v. King, No. 5:09-HC2076-FA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54655, at *24 (E.D.N.C. Ap. 17, 2013); United States v. Volungus,
No. 07-12060-GAO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31069, at *24 (D. Mass. Mar. 8, 2012); United States v.
Hunt, 643 F. Supp. 2d 161, 171 (D. Mass. 2009); United States v. Harnden, No. CV 06-6960 DSF,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97341, at *28 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2006). Notably, only one of these cases was
published.
139. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 7.
140. Hanson et al., Risk Categories, supra note 98, at 589.
141. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 93; McGrath et al., supra note 121, at 444.
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different replication studies when the creators found significantly lower rates
of recidivism than originally published, a change that has been incorporated into
the Static-99R.142 The present AUC rates are based off of a sample of 8805
sexual offenders from twenty-three different studies.143 Even though the sample
population has increased significantly since the first iteration of the Static-99,
its accuracy remains overlooked—or, at a minimum, underacknowledged—in
judicial opinions.
Though rarely discussed in the literature, the sample population used to
develop and validate the Static-99R presents problems for its use in a United
States population. Of the twenty-three studies, only 21% of the individuals
studied were from the United States (n = 1811).144 Though it is beneficial to
assess the Static-99R’s applicability across different countries and cultures, the
Static-99R developers did not include a variable for how the law in different
countries might have an effect on the accuracy of the instrument.145 Instead, the
creators only looked at the time between release and the next charge or
conviction if there was one. Although these two categories were evenly split in
the study overall (charges n = 10, convictions n = 11), only one of the five studies
from the United States used conviction data; the other four used only charges.146
While many of the countries generally agree on crimes that constitute sexual
offenses, there are important differences as well.
For example, in Canada, which comprises 33% of the population studied
(n = 2865),147 the Solicitor General’s High Risk Offenders Working Group
concluded that civil commitment processes would “not meet the constraints
posed by Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” which led to the
government’s decision not to create a civil commitment scheme in the
country.148 Studies have noted that although there are “myriad similarities
between the United States and Canada . . . correctional philosophies and
practices can be quite different, with criminal sentences in the United States
tending to be longer and more frequently employed in managing risk posed by
offenders.”149 The study also notes that sexual offenders in Canada “receive
determinate sentences and return to the community at the end of those

142. Hanson et al., Risk Categories, supra note 98, at 593.
143. Id.
144. See Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates, supra note 18, at 223.
145. See id. The data provided in this study indicates that there was no variable accounting for
differences in law in different countries.
146. Id. at 223–24.
147. Id. at 223.
148. Michael Petrunik, Lisa Murphy & J. Paul Fedoroff, American and Canadian Approaches to Sex
Offenders: A Study of the Politics of Dangerousness, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 111, 117 (2008).
149. Robin J. Wilson et al., Comparing Sexual Offenders at the Regional Treatment Centre (Ontario)
and the Florida Civil Commitment Center, 57 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY
377, 378 (2012).
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sentences,” in direct contrast to the United States where many states and the
federal government permit civil commitment.150 Though a small-scale study
suggests that civil commitment has no effect on recidivism rate,151 it remains
unknown whether the Static-99R is equally accurate in the United States and
Canada.
In Sweden, which accounts for 15% of the study population (n = 1278),152
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognizes that the increase in sexual offenses
within the past decade is due, in large part, to changes in Swedish legislation,
such as expanding the definition of rape.153 The Ministry specifically
acknowledges that “it is difficult to compare the figures [of sexual offenses rates]
over time.”154 Furthermore, the Ministry adds that “[i]t is also difficult to make
international comparisons based on crime statistics, as many acts that are
considered rape under Swedish law are not considered rape in many other
countries.”155 Though the Swedish government does not delineate specifically
what countries record and charge crimes differently, the government highlights
“three important factors to remember” that differentiate Swedish criminal
statistics from other countries: (1) all reported events are recorded as crimes,
even if some of these events are later found not to constitute criminal offenses;
(2) every offense that occurs at the same time is counted separately, even though
many countries may record “offenses of the same kind against a single victim”
as one crime; and (3) attempted offenses are “counted together with completed
crimes.”156 As a result, Sweden may be calculating higher recidivism rates than
those in the United States, particularly as it relates to charged but not convicted
offenses, thereby skewing the applicability of the Static-99R’s dataset to a
United States population.
Other notable differences exist in the international population. Germany,
which accounts for 10.6% of the sample (n = 936),157 does not have mandatory
reporting laws for suspected incidents of child molestation.158 Compared to
150. Id.
151. See id. at 388.
152. Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates, supra note 18, at 223.
153. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Facts About Migration, Integration and Crime in Sweden, GOV’T
OFFS. SWED. (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.government.se/articles/2017/02/facts-about-migrationand-crime-in-sweden/ [https://perma.cc/VLP2-SAT2].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Crime in Sweden—The Difficulties in Making International Comparisons, BRÅ (emphasis omitted),
https://www.bra.se/bra-in-english/home/crime-and-statistics/international-comparisons.html
[https://perma.cc/N4VG-X4VA].
157. Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates, supra note 18, at 223.
158. Henning Wißmann, Mike Peters & Sabine Müller, Physical or Psychological Child Abuse and
Neglect: Experiences, Reporting Behavior and Positions Toward Mandatory Reporting of Pediatricians in Berlin,
Germany, 98 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 104165, 104165 (2019); Andreas Witt et al., Trends in Child
Maltreatment in Germany: Comparison of Two Representative Population-Based Studies, 12 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY & MENTAL HEALTH 24, 24 (2018).
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countries which require mandatory reporting, Germany may have lower charge
and conviction rates, since fewer cases are investigated. Austria, which accounts
for 8% of the sample population (n = 706),159 changed its age of consent laws in
2002, lowering the age from nineteen to fourteen.160 Since the Static-99 creators
relied on a study of recidivism in the timeframe of 2000–2005, it is unclear
whether these recidivism rates are accurate within Austria, let alone outside of
Austria. New Zealand, accounting for 5.6% of the population (n = 492),161 allows
a court to impose an additional sentence of up to five years for sexual offenders
who the court believes may be likely to reoffend.162 While similar to civil
commitment, the maximum length of time differentiates it, and the deterrent
effect of this law remains unclear. The United Kingdom represents 4.6% of the
study population (n = 406).163 The UK, however, does not permit civil
commitment and recognizes it as a human rights violation, famously going so
far as to refuse to extradite an accused United States sexual offender on the
grounds that he could be civilly committed if returned to the United States.164
Denmark, which hosts 3.5% of the study population (n = 311),165 recently
increased penalties for sexual offenses, and the deterrent effect of this law has
not yet been studied as it relates to the applicability of the Static-99R.166 The
combined inconsistency of laws and policies and lack of research on each of
these specific populations as it relates to the accuracy of the Static-99R raises
serious concerns about the applicability of the instrument to United States
sexual offenders.
Experts routinely generalize the findings from these twenty-three sexual
offender studies to the United States’ federally incarcerated population despite
criticism.167 The different countries represented in the studies all have different

159. Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates, supra note 18, at 223.
160. See generally L. and V. v. Austria, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (evaluating the age of consent and
whether equal rights were violated if the age of consent is different for heterosexual adolescents and
homosexual adolescents).
161. Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates, supra note 18, at 223.
162. Kristina White, Registering Public Fear: An Analysis of the New Zealand Child Sex Offender
Government Agency Register, 8 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON LEGAL RES. PAPERS 1, 19 (2017).
163. Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates, supra note 18, at 223.
164. David Post, Opinion, U.K. Court Declares that California Civil Confinement Law Constitutes a
‘Flagrant Abuse’ of Human Rights, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:03 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/26/u-k-court-declares-thatcalifornia-civil-confinement-law-constitutes-a-flagrant-abuse-of-human-rights/
[https://perma.cc/
9532-7LJQ (dark archive)].
165. Id.
166. Wendy Zelden, Denmark: Higher Penalties for Rape and Other Violent Crimes Contemplated,
LIBR. CONGRESS: GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreignnews/article/denmark-higher-penalties-for-rape-and-other-violent-crimes-contemplated/
[https://perma.cc/V6K7-ZRZU].
167. See Sex Offender Risk Assessment, supra note 100.
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laws and cultural norms for sexual offenses.168 A paper authored by many of the
creators of the Static-99R provides an example, cautioning that since “[n]ot all
sexual offenses are universal,” to apply “actuarial tools to behaviors beyond the
scope of the scale’s development can be an inappropriate extrapolation.”169 The
authors give the example of statutory rape, describing that “laws in some
countries prohibit an 18-year-old male from having sex with his willing 16-yearold girlfriend,” but that “this activity was not illegal in the countries on which
Static-99 was developed (Canada and the United Kingdom). The meaning of
this type of behavior may be sufficiently distinct from the types of activities
captured in the development of Static-99.”170 The authors then specifically state
that “applying [the Static-99] to cases of ‘consensual’ teenage sex among
similar-aged peers is not recommended.”171
A short hypothetical helps to explain the dilemma of the Static-99R. Mr.
Scott is a thirty-four-year-old male. When he was eighteen, he had consensual
sex with his sixteen-year-old girlfriend of one year. Her parents found out, and
because of the multiple instances of sexual intercourse, the district attorney
charged Mr. Scott with three counts of statutory rape—a sexual crime—but
later dropped the charges. Four years later, when Mr. Scott was twenty-two, he
was in a bar fight and was convicted of assault. Mr. Scott has never lived with
any of his girlfriends. Now, Mr. Scott is to be released from his present sentence
for sexual battery and physical assault of his new girlfriend of three months but
maintains his innocence and says his public defender told him he needed to take
a plea deal.
On the Static-99R, Mr. Scott would receive one point for being released
after age eighteen but before thirty-five, one point for never having lived with
a lover for at least two years, one point for having a violent crime attached to
the offense for which he is currently in prison, one point for having a prior
conviction for a violent act, and two points for simply having three prior charges
for sexual crimes. Whether or not he was convicted of these charges is irrelevant
for the purposes of the Static-99R. Mr. Scott would score a six on the Static99R, placing him in the category labeled “well-above-average risk” of
reoffending, which is the highest category of risk provided in the Static-99R,
despite never being convicted of a sexual offense until the present instance.
If Mr. Scott lived in Canada, where statutory rape is not an offense for
which he could be charged, and had served one more year in prison so his age
at release would be thirty-five, his score would be a three on the Static-99R,
which would place him in the “average risk” of reoffending category, indicating
that he is no more likely to recidivate than any other offender.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Helmus et al., supra note 8, at 59.
Id.
Id. at 59–60.
Id.
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The government likely would not even attempt to civilly commit Mr.
Scott since there is no indication of a mental illness. The above example
illustrates how easy it is to score in a high-risk category with relatively common
charges and convictions and shows how simply living in a different jurisdiction
could dramatically affect the likelihood of reoffense analysis. Because of the
variability in laws from the countries included in the study, the populations
studied may not accurately reflect risks of reoffense in the United States;
statutory rape is just one example where countries differ on sexual crimes.172
Even studies limited to determining the accuracy of the Static-99R within one
country have found that the accuracy of the instrument varies by race or ethnic
group.173 Because the United States only represented 21% of the study’s sample
and no studies have focused on the application of the Static-99R to an
exclusively American population, the accuracy of the instrument as applied to
an American population is unknown, which is problematic.174
E.

Understanding What the Static-99R Means

In addition to the above problem of the demographic sample, the Static99R also does not speak to an individual’s likelihood of reoffending. Instead, it
explains the rate at which all offenders who scored similarly reoffend. To
illustrate this nuance, consider rates of smoking. In the United States, 17.1% of
the adult population is classified as a smoker.175 That does not mean that each
person in the United States is 17.1% likely to become a smoker; it means that
presently, out of all of the people in the United States, 17.1% smoke.176 Because
of extensive scientific research, we know what traits are more closely associated
with smokers as compared to nonsmokers, such as having a low income, not
completing high school, and living in an urban setting.177 We can combine those
factors and get a more accurate prediction as to whether someone is likely to
become a smoker or not in the first place, and ultimately we find out whether
or not someone is a smoker. We also know that, of the 55.4% of smokers who

172. For instance, many countries still consider homosexual acts to be sexual crimes. Pamela
Duncan, Gay Relationships Are Still Criminalised in 72 Countries, Report Finds, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/27/gay-relationships-still-criminalised-countries-report
[https://perma.cc/74T5-BMAY].
173. Niklas Långström, Accuracy of Actuarial Procedures for Assessment of Sexual Offender Recidivism
Risk May Vary Across Ethnicity, 16 SEXUAL ABUSE 107, 116 (2004) (finding that the Static-99 was “not
able to distinguish African Asian recidivists from nonrecidivists” but did prove “accurate for the
prediction of any sexual recidivism in Nordic and European sexual offenders”).
174. See PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 63–67 (instructing how to code the prior charges and
convictions item but not commenting on statutory rape as an excluded charge or conviction).
175. AM.’S HEALTH RANKINGS, ANNUAL REPORT 68 (2018).
176. See id.
177. Id. at 68–69.
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have attempted to quit, less than 10% were successful.178 We do not have the
science to understand why such a small number were successful (although we
do have suspicions), nor do we know any scientifically validated factors that
might make one person with equal access to the same resources more successful
than another at quitting smoking despite his or her stated desire to quit.179
The Static-99R functions much in the same way. It looks at what the past
traits of sexual offenders are to determine what factors are most related to sexual
reoffense. It can tell us how often something happens within a group of people,
but not why that thing happens with some people but not others.
For instance, if Mr. Scott scores a six (Level IVb well-above-average risk),
he can then be compared to all study participants who have scored a six
according to the “high risk/need” classification.180 The most recent analysis
demonstrated that sixteen out of thirty-nine offenders studied who scored a six
reoffended, or 41%, at a ten-year follow-up.181 Think of this first part like
knowing that 17.1% of the population smokes. The next step is a nuanced
distinction. Mr. Scott is not himself 41% likely to recidivate (just like how each
person in the United States is not 17.1% likely to be a smoker); rather,
individuals who score the same as Mr. Scott recidivate at a rate of 41% over ten
years. Similarly, we do not know why out of 55.4% of people who try to quit
smoking, only 10% are successful. But we do know that 10% are successful. The
Static-99R does not predict whether Mr. Scott himself will recidivate (or
successfully quit smoking), nor does it offer any information that might indicate
whether Mr. Scott would be in the “in” group, representing 41% of the
population studied, or in the “out” group, representing 59% of the population
studied.
It would be incorrect to say that Mr. Scott has a 41% chance of reoffending.
It would be much more accurate to say that out of the individuals studied who
scored the same as Mr. Scott on the Static-99R, within ten years, 41% had
reoffended. We do not have the science to know what specific factors are
associated with the individuals who made up the 41%. We only know that they
did reoffend. Therefore, we do not know if Mr. Scott will reoffend. Mr. Scott
himself may have anywhere from a 0% chance to a 100% chance of reoffending.
All we know is that out of a cohort who received the same score, 41% will
reoffend within ten years.
The creators of the Static-99R were well aware that the instrument does
not capture all relevant information.182 The instrument’s manual even states that
178. Stephen Babb, Quitting Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2000–2015, 65 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1457, 1459–60 (2017).
179. See id.
180. Hanson et al., supra, supp.
181. Id.
182. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 7.
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“a prudent evaluator will always consider other external factors, such as dynamic
or changeable risk factors, that may influence risk in either direction.”183 The
manual elaborates with examples, such as if the offender states he wants to harm
his victims (higher risk) or if the offender was constantly in the “company of
someone who will support non-offending (lower risk).”184 As the manual wisely
advises, the “Static-99R is intended as one component of a risk assessment
report. Additional information should be considered external to the scale.”185
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF USING THE STATIC-99R
Now that the scientific limitations of the Static-99R have been explored,
the instrument’s limitations will be explored from the legal perspective. This
part will look at how courts actually apply the Static-99R in AWA cases and
whether that application is appropriate to demonstrate that an individual would
have serious difficulty refraining from reoffending, as the Act requires. This
part begins with some considerations specific to those who are civilly
committed, explores how courts understand the Static-99R, and ends with a
discussion of whether the Static-99R speaks to the statutory language.
A.

Special Considerations of the Static-99R for Civilly Committed Persons

As the name indicates, the Static-99R involves factors that are designed
not to change while incarcerated.186 Although this Comment primarily focuses
on the use of Static-99R in initial commitment hearings, this problem is
compounded for release hearings. The Static-99R is used in both types of
hearings frequently and is often incorporated in a new evaluation to determine
if the individual is sexually dangerous, rather than referencing the previous
Static-99R from the record.
Rescoring the Static-99R as a new piece of evidence is problematic because
it signals to judges that the person has not “progressed” in some way. These
reports do not typically acknowledge that only unusual circumstances would
cause the Static-99R to change, and the government in particular is quick to
point out when a decrease is due only to age.187 Rescoring the Static-99R implies
that there are individuals whose Static-99R scores could change, and that this
particular offender is not one of them. This is misleading. Though theoretically
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Some factors may increase while in prison. For example, an individual could be charged with
other sexual crimes, and even convicted of them. But most individuals, particularly those who are
incarcerated for lengthy sentences, will not be charged with or convicted of an additional crime. Thus,
it is unlikely that someone who is serving a twenty-year sentence would be charged with an additional
crime in year twenty of his sentence, just before his civil commitment certification.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d 586, 593–94 (E.D.N.C. 2018) (discussing
that the government’s expert witnesses gave less weight to the age factor on the Static-99R).
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a Static-99R score may decrease, perhaps due to an initial miscalculation or a
reversal of a conviction on appeal, by the time someone reaches the civil
commitment stage, either in an initial commitment or a release hearing, his
Static-99R score is likely so high that any minor error would not make a
meaningful difference in the Static-99R classification.
An individual’s Static-99R score, at the time all crimes have been revealed,
would have no ability to change aside from advancing age.188 Prior to an initial
commitment hearing, an individual would likely not have had a reason to be
scored on the Static-99R, so its inclusion in these hearings is understandable,
though often misinterpreted as described below. Many individuals who are
civilly committed under the AWA were early commitments, dating nearly to
the start of the Act, and have been committed for a decade or more. The use of
the Static-99R, particularly coupled with statements indicating that any
decrease due to age is not meaningful, skews both what the instrument is
designed to do and what information can be gleaned from the instrument.
B.

Issues in Court Analyses of Static-99R Scores—United States v. Schmidt

Perhaps the biggest drawback to the Static-99R’s use is that courts must
grapple with the Static-99R in the context of complex expert witness testimony.
In AWA cases, that testimony can become highly statistical and somewhat
manipulated; well-intentioned judicial opinions display the misuse of these
instruments. One issue that frequently arises in civil commitment hearings is
determining which expert is correct.189 Nearly all experts will use the Static99R, among other tools, to evaluate an offender.190 Interestingly, evaluators will
commonly score the offender differently,191 despite the Static-99R’s claim of
great inter-rater reliability leading to consistency in scoring. The recent case
United States v. Schmidt192 provides useful language for analysis. This case
revolved around a seventy-five-year-old man who committed his first act of
child molestation in 1984 and had a lengthy criminal sexual history.193 The
Bureau of Prisons attempted to certify Schmidt as a sexually dangerous person,
but the district court found that he did not meet the criteria for commitment.194
The court explained that out of the five experts who testified, “the Court
elect[ed] to give [one of the government’s experts] testimony less weight, apart
188. See supra Part II.
189. See, e.g., Wooden II, 887 F.3d 591, 601 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing credibility and consistency
of expert testimony).
190. Reinhard Eher et al., Failure of Static-99 and SORAG to Predict Relevant Reoffense Categories in
Relevant Sexual Offender Subtypes: A Prospective Study, 3 SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT 1, 1 (2008)
(“Presently, the Static-99 is the most widely used actuarial risk assessment tool for sex offenders.”).
191. See, e.g., Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
192. 295 F. Supp. 3d 586 (E.D.N.C. 2018).
193. Id. at 590, 593.
194. Id. at 589.
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from again emphasizing her determination that respondent scored a 3–4 on the
Static-99R, which corresponds to a moderate risk.”195 The other four experts
“all scored the respondent as a 5 on the Static 99R.”196 Two experts “put his risk
of recidivism at 15 to 21% over a five year period,” but a third expert “found
that the recidivism rate was 15.2% over five years.”197 After describing that two
experts also conducted additional assessments, including the Static-2002R198
and SVR-20, each finding different results, the court noted that “these
assessments represent averages, and do not cleanly line up with any one
individual’s actual risk of offending.”199
The court addressed dynamic risk factors before summarizing the
testimony:
Both Dr. Saleh and Dr. Plaud testified that respondent would not have
serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child
molestation if released. Dr. Hastings and Dr. Zinik, while coming to
similar conclusions in their actuarial analysis, gave less weight both to
respondent’s age and his lack of infractions over the last fifteen years in
finding that he would have difficulty. Because this Court finds that
respondent’s age and current status are highly relevant, it chooses to give
Dr. Saleh and Dr. Plaud’s testimony more weight. While respondent was
first convicted later in life than others committing similar offenses, at
the age of 41, he is still now 75 years old.200
To begin, the court acknowledged a credibility issue arising out of
differing Static-99R scores. The court, however, did not proceed to analyze (1)
how the scores could possibly be different between the evaluators and (2) how
an evaluator could have a range for a Static-99R score given that the assessment
is supposed to be based off of concrete and agreed-upon facts. The same issue
arose with the Static-2002R scoring. Given that these are actuarial instruments,
each scorer should have identical information and therefore should arrive at the
same score. Furthermore, because the Static-99R instrument is accompanied
with a scoring chart, two evaluators should not be able to give a range of risk of
reoffense scores if one can give a precise numeric value to risk of reoffense.
Schmidt is one of many cases that expose courts’ apparent acceptance of
rater discretion when scoring the Static-99R. In United States v. Matherly,201 for
195. Id. at 593.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. The Static “suite” has undergone several minor revisions over time and each has been
validated with new score tables. The Static-99R is considered presently to be the most accurate. For
more information, see generally STATIC-99: CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.static99.org/
[https://perma.cc/NRL7-VBAT].
199. Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
200. Id. at 593–94.
201. No. 5:06-HC-2205-BR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190629 (E.D.N.C. May 3, 2012).
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instance, the court noted that Dr. Zinik assigned a score of 7 on the Static-99R,
and that, “[s]imilar to Dr. Zinik, Dr. Cunic gave . . . a score of 7 on the Static99R.”202 By including “similar,” the court implied that there is an option, or
even an expectation, that the scores might not match and that because the scores
actually did the result is more valid. The court’s default understanding is
opposite of what it should be: that the Static-99R score should be the same
across all evaluators and any differences should raise skepticism about the
instrument’s validity for that individual.
The Schmidt court importantly recognized that these scores do not equate
to an individual’s risk of reoffending and engaged in a discussion of relevant
dynamic factors.203 However, this portion of the opinion exposes some
misunderstandings about what questions are contained in the Static-99R and
how that impacts the likelihood of recidivism. Because age is inherently a part
of the Static-99R scoring—so much so that it can affect an offender’s final score
by a range of four points—age is already accounted for in the score. To say that
an evaluator gave more or less weight to age essentially says that they are
providing an opinion as to the validity of the Static-99R itself. Those factors
not accounted for in the Static-99R, such as lack of infractions while confined,
provide new and additional information that a judge should consider to more
accurately assess the third prong that does not call into question the validity of
the Static-99R.
The problems with the Static-99R scoring are not limited to judicial
interpretations. Evaluators themselves clearly err when administering the
Static-99R. In an earlier AWA case, one evaluator changed her score via
testimony after hearing portions of other experts’ testimony.204 She apparently
determined that the respondent had a “lack of intimate, adult relationships,”
and consequently added one point to the second item, thereby making her score
match that of the other evaluators.205 The second item is scored either as a “1”
or “0” based on whether the offender has “[e]ver lived with a lover for at least
two years.”206 Using professional judgment to gauge whether an offender has
well-developed adult relationships is a clinical judgment issue, not a factual
inquiry. This is the exact type of discretion that the Static-99R was designed to
avoid, yet the evaluator used such discretion to increase her score of the
respondent, consequently placing the respondent in a higher risk category than
the instrument should have.
202. Id. at *22 n.7.
203. Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 593 (“[T]hese assessments represent averages, and do not cleanly
line up with any one individual’s actual risk of offending.”).
204. United States v. Perez, No. 5:11-HC-2015-BR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161916, at *12 n.3
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 13, 2012).
205. Id.
206. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 94.
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Past Criminal History Versus Present Condition

In determining present dangerousness, courts must balance the weight
afforded to past acts as compared with present condition. Courts should
consider a respondent’s present condition in addition to his past criminal
history. Courts have expressed that past criminal history alone is insufficient to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that an individual would have
serious difficulty refraining from reoffending. Yet, courts are willing to
acknowledge that past criminal history may have a role in future offending.
Although some decisions indicate that courts are aware that the Static-99R is
based on past acts,207 they do not seem to understand the dual weight being
placed on past criminal history when incorporating the Static-99R into their
analysis of dangerousness.
A compelling and logical recidivism argument is that an offender who
perpetually repeats their crimes has historically demonstrated that they have
serious difficulty refraining from reoffending, since they have been convicted
of the crime already and will choose to do it again. Not surprisingly, Dr. Phenix,
a creator of the Static-99R, has testified that she chooses to focus on preincarceration actions because of her “belief that actions taken while in the
outside world are more accurate predictors of future behavior upon release.”208
The First Circuit has recognized that “[a] court could reasonably conclude
that an individual who has committed multiple offenses but successfully
completed a rehabilitation program may be less dangerous than someone who
has committed one offense but exhibits a perpetual desire or propensity to
commit more offenses.”209 Although this analysis is correct, a court’s hesitance
to release a sexual offender with a lengthy and disturbing criminal history is
understandable.210
AWA hearing opinions—particularly those in which an initial
commitment is overturned on appeal—emphasize that past acts and criminal
history are relevant but cannot be the sole basis of determining recidivism.211
By ignoring past actions in a determination of dangerousness, one overlooks
important information. Recently, the Fourth Circuit upheld a release order over
the government’s appeal in part because the district court found that the
government’s experts “relied too heavily upon historical criminal behavior to
justify their conclusions that [the respondent] is currently sexually

207. See, e.g., Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
208. United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 168–69 (4th Cir. 2014).
209. United States v. Volungus, 730 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir. 2013).
210. See, e.g., Anne Blythe, Man Who NC Prosecutors Tried To Keep in Prison Now Wanted for Murder
in Missouri, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh May 22, 2015, 7:25 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/
news/local/crime/article21733404.html [https://perma.cc/YR98-JJ66].
211. See Antone, 742 F.3d at 167–68.
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dangerous.”212 The Fourth Circuit supported the district court’s decision not to
heavily weigh actuarial instruments because they are “based almost entirely on
historical factors which can never change and do not account for any
development in . . . mental health.”213
Yet courts and evaluators alike seem to “double count” these factors. For
example, one evaluator’s report stated that the offender’s “past history and high
scores on the Static-99R . . . indicate a very high probability that his past
patterns of sexually abusing children will continue.”214 Thus, past history
appears to have been a factor outside the Static-99R; yet the Static-99R, as
explained in Part II, is comprised entirely of the known past history.215 The
court then explained that it acknowledged the actuarial instruments but placed
“greater weight” on “factors outside the actuarial scheme,” including relapse
(meaning the commission of another sexual crime).216 In doing so, the court
demonstrated its misunderstanding of what is actually included in the actuarial
scheme since relapse is incorporated.217
D.

The “Serious Difficulty Refraining” Issue and Static-99R

Given these problems, both intrinsic to the instrument and the way courts
use the instrument, courts should critically analyze experts’ opinions,
particularly those that heavily rely on actuarial instruments like the Static-99R.
Courts must remember that although “likelihood of reoffense” and “serious
difficulty refraining” from reoffense can overlap, they are not inherently the
same inquiry. Therefore, courts should be cautious and ensure their analysis
matches the statutory language. Courts should recognize that the Static-99R
provides a background framework to understand statistical risk of reoffense
while also recognizing that traits unique to the individual that are used to gauge
whether an individual should be civilly committed are not captured in the
instrument.
The intention of the AWA is clear: to civilly commit sexual offenders who,
because of a mental illness, are likely to reoffend.218 The statutory language does
not match the intention of the Act. Instead, it requires confinement of those
who would have serious difficulty refraining from reoffending.219 Courts are in
the unenviable position of having to toe the line between upholding the

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Wooden II, 887 F.3d 591, 601 (4th Cir. 2018).
Id.
United States v. Bolander, 722 F.3d 199, 212–13 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
See supra Part II.
Bolander, 727 F.3d at 215.
See PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 94.
See United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2014).
18 U.S.C. § 4247(a) (2018).
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intention of the act and adhering to the statutory language. Such a conundrum
results in opinion passages like the following:
[E]ven if the court were to fully credit Drs. Ross and Malinek’s estimate
that respondent’s risk of re-offense is 30% at five years, . . . that still
leaves a greater than 70% chance respondent will not re-offend. Given
the evidence of volitional control in this particular case . . . the actuarial
assessments do not leave the court with a definite and firm conviction
respondent will commit another contact sex offense if released.220
Here, the court uses the Static-99R to estimate this respondent’s likelihood
to reoffend.221 Such an assumption, as discussed earlier, is not supported by the
literature and is erroneous.222 The court then appropriately acknowledged a
volitional control consideration which would tend to speak to the “serious
difficulty from refraining” language in the Act.223 The court ended not with the
statutory language but with the intention of the Act.224 Although the court used
some of the correct scientific considerations, the court here appeared to be
confused about whether to adhere to the intention of the Act or the Act itself,
ultimately misusing the Static-99R and misapplying the inferences gleaned
from it.225
Some opinions have grappled with the issue by simply concluding that,
because the actuarial instruments “by their own terms” have classified someone
as high risk for reoffending, the respondent “may be presumed to have the most
difficulty refraining from sexual reoffending.”226 This conclusory language is
highly flawed in a scientific application. Simply because someone has conducted
an act many times in the past does not definitively determine whether or not
they would have serious difficulty refraining from that activity in the future. When
considering the liberty interest at stake, since civil commitment is indefinite, it
is vitally important that courts do not assume scientific truths just because the
evidence would be easier to understand that way.
Courts have said that the crux of the difficulty in resolving the third prong
is that “there is no crystal ball that an examining expert or court might consult
to predict conclusively whether a past offender will recidivate.”227 Though this
statement is undoubtedly true, the court’s logic is flawed. The statute requires
220. United States v. Castle, No. 5:17-HC-2204-FL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133426, at *52
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2018).
221. Id.
222. Supra Section II.E.
223. Castle, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133426, at *53.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. United States v. Lange, No. 5:08-HC-2070, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159498, at *35 (E.D.N.C.
Nov. 7, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440,
461 (4th Cir. 2012)).
227. United States v. Shields, 649 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2011).
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a finding that an individual would have serious difficulty refraining from
reoffending, not whether a past offender will or is likely to recidivate. But there
are many things that an individual may be likely to do at some point in their life
that he or she would not have serious difficulty refraining from doing. Here is an
innocuous example: someone with a sweet tooth might be very likely to
purchase and eat a doughnut later in life. That does not indicate that they would
have serious difficulty refraining from purchasing and eating a donut if they
were forbidden from doing so. The issues faced by sexual offenders and those
with mental illness are much more complex, but the premise that control is not
synonymous with likelihood spans the analogy.
Because the AWA is relatively young, the case law surrounding the nuance
between likelihood and difficulty is limited. State law cases provide an
important question that federal courts will inevitably grapple with as well.
Many states have attempted to create a “threshold” risk of recidivism to answer
the third prong by the relevant evidentiary burden. While some states indicate
that the risk of reoffense must be higher than 50%,228 others have held the risk
must be “more likely than not,”229 and others still have simply held that a
majority likelihood is not necessary.230 In each of these cases the state statute
specified that the respondent must be likely to reoffend.231
The early AWA cases likely looked to state cases to attempt to resolve the
“serious difficulty” inquiry. The Fourth Circuit made clear the relationship of
likelihood to serious difficulty, finding that the district court erred by insisting
on “proof of a greater than 50% risk of recidivism,” because it “finds no support
in the language of the Act.”232 The Fourth Circuit then adopted a portion of a
Massachusetts opinion, which held that “[r]ecidivism rates are circumstantially
relevant to the serious difficulty inquiry because offenders who continually
expose themselves to punishment may be presumed to have the most difficulty
refraining from sexual reoffending.”233 But the court recognized that “the
ultimate question called for by the Act concerns the self-control of an individual, not the
statistical rearrest patterns of a given population.”234 The court invoked the Crane
228. Westerheide v. State, 767 So. 2d 637, 660, 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (Sharp, J.,
concurring) (noting that because of the liberty interest at stake, a high barrier should be in place to
civilly commit).
229. In re W.Z., 773 A.2d 97, 112 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
230. In re G.R.H, 711 N.W.2d 587, 594–95 (N.D. 2006) (finding that, under North Dakota’s
statute, when expert testimony established that a respondent would have serious difficulty refraining
from reoffending, the court permissibly inferred that the respondent would be likely to reoffend).
231. See Westerheide, 767 So. 2d at 660; In re W.Z., 773 A.2d at 115–16; In re G.R.H., 711 N.W.2d
at 594–95.
232. United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 461 (4th Cir. 2012).
233. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Hunt, 643
F. Supp. 2d 161, 180 (D. Mass. 2009)).
234. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Hunt, 643
F. Supp. 2d 161, 180 (D. Mass. 2009)).
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analysis, which emphasized that serious difficulty and recidivism risk will not
be demonstrable with mathematical precision.235
The case law is scattered in its treatment of the Static-99R. Some decisions
place great weight on expert opinion based on the instrument while others seem
underwhelmed by its incorporation into an expert opinion.236 The prevailing
definition of “clear and convincing evidence” is that the evidence is of such a
nature as to produce a firm conviction in the mind of the trier of fact so that
there is no hesitancy in the perceived truth.237 Given that the Static-99R is
riddled with more questions than answers, it is difficult to imagine how the
instrument could be construed to rise to the level of “clear and convincing”
evidence.
What is clear in courts’ treatment of the Static-99R, whether the
instrument is highly regarded or mentioned in passing, is that it is poorly
understood. This inconsistency in application raises serious concerns about the
Static-99R and its use in courts. Given the gravity of the liberty interest at
stake, clarity and consistency are necessary moving forward.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
I believe there are many factors that you look at as far as a civil commitment is
concerned. Certainly you have heard the last two days of a lot of discussion about
actuarials. One of the things that is really missing is the dynamic factors of how
that person is now [as compared to his former] acts. Static, meaning it’s all said
and done and it’s easy to score, . . . but the dynamic factors allow for the growth
of a person to change or it allows for the person not to change.238
“Sex offender” is not a mental health diagnosis; instead, sexual offending
can occur as a result of one too many mental health diagnoses, or of none at
all.239 The causes of sexual offending are not well understood, and the reason a
violent rapist offends is likely different than that of a child pornography
creator.240 Scientific meta-analyses demonstrate that treatment can be effective
at reducing rates of sexual recidivism.241 Given that the reasons that individuals

235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Wooden II, 887 F.3d 591, 601 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Schmidt, 295 F. Supp.
3d 586, 593 (E.D.N.C. 2018).
237. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979).
238. United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 163 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting one of the expert
witnesses).
239. Renee Sorrentino et al., Sex Offenders: General Information and Treatment, 48 PSYCHIATRIC
ANNALS 120, 120–21 (2018); see also supra Section II.D (discussing Mr. Scott and the case of statutory
rape).
240. See Dominique A. Simons, Sex Offender Typologies, in SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING INITIATIVE, supra note 96, at 61, 80.
241. Sorrentino et al., supra note 239, at 120–21.
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sexually offend vary widely, an individualized approach is necessary to
accurately assess an individual’s dangerousness.242
The Static-99R and other similar static instruments provide necessary
information to the courts, and this Comment does not argue that they should
never be used. Rather, this Comment aims to demonstrate their misuse by
courts and the availability of other information that, when combined with other
information, paints a more accurate depiction of what “serious difficulty
refraining from reoffending” means. No scientific literature specifically links
the Static-99R with difficulty refraining from reoffending. Regarding the
Static-99R in a vacuum when a statute calls for an assessment of likelihood of
reoffense is a legitimate use of the instrument—though other factors may still
be relevant. The language of “likelihood” is simply not what the AWA requires,
and instead evidence must demonstrate something more than actuarial
information about how often offenders in a particular group reoffend.
As the quote above indicates, courts can look at many other factors aside
from actuarial instruments that either speak to different aspects of the third
prong or increase the reliability of the data. This section discusses the
alternatives to relying on actuarial instruments.
A.

Conduct While Confined

One contested factor critical to understanding if an individual would have
“serious difficulty refraining” from reoffense is the respondent’s conduct while
confined. Conduct while confined can speak to volitional control, and although
it remains uncertain whether a volitional control issue is required as a finding
in order to civilly commit a respondent, many cases still discuss volitional
control.243
Failure to recognize conduct while incarcerated and reliance only on acts
that occurred prior to conviction can potentially rob an offender of decades of
personal growth and progress. One recent ruling recognizes this delicate balance
for an offender who had been in prison for sixteen years and civilly committed
for an additional ten.244 In a lengthy opinion, the court found that the
respondent had progressed in treatment and that his behavior had improved
over the length of his sentence.245 The court further found that, because of the
respondent’s neurocognitive disorder, he was unable to progress further in
treatment and that the Static-99R did not apply to him as it might to other
offenders.246 This nuanced approach recognizes the importance of time and
242. Pamela M. Yates, Treatment of Sexual Offenders: Research, Best Practices, and Emerging Models,
8 INT’L. J. BEHAV. CONSULTATION & THERAPY 89, 93 (2013).
243. United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 463 (4th Cir. 2012).
244. See Yates Order, supra note 95, at 2–3.
245. Id. at 26.
246. See id. at 21.
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progress while confined, something that is absent particularly from older AWA
cases.
Many courts quickly dismiss exemplary conduct while confined under the
pretext that confinement does not represent reality since there are not
conventional external stimuli.247 Although earlier AWA cases stated that
conduct while confined was important, they often failed to include such an
analysis when the facts may well have been beneficial to the respondent.248
Newer cases more heavily weigh the fact that “a period of incarceration does
not freeze the inquiry at the moment an inmate entered prison,” recognizing
that for lengthy sentences “[m]uch of the expert testimony offered by the
government would have been identical if this inquiry had been held [at the date
of incarceration].”249
Critics argue that confinement does not reflect the outside world, and
therefore conduct while confined should not be considered in commitment
hearings.250 While prison provides a controlled environment, certain offenders
continually get into fights or commit other acts of aggression against fellow
inmates.251 Given that the entire purpose of the AWA is to civilly commit the
atypical and exceptionally dangerous offender and that nearly 0.5% of the adult
male prison population will be a victim of sexual violence,252 it is illogical to
think that a primary way to identify who would have the most serious difficulty
refraining from reoffending would exclude conduct while confined. Though not
identical to the outside world, conduct while confined can be a valuable
indicator of present dangerousness, especially when considering that a civilly
committed individual has typically been confined for decades.
Furthermore, the scientific analyses of this principle do not support the
proposition.253 Some experts are rightly wary of unstructured clinical opinions,
viewing them as less accurate than actuarial instruments, and an evaluator
considering conduct while confined would require clinical opinion.254 However,
incorporating conduct while confined is a far cry from the poorly predictive,
unstructured clinical judgments in the early days of civil commitment.255
247. United States v. Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d 586, 594 (4th Cir. 2018).
248. Findings and Conclusions at 23, United States v. Blackledge, No. 5:09-HC-02118-D
(E.D.N.C. March 7, 2017), ECF No. 156 (acknowledging that conduct while confined was important
to an inquiry of sexual dangerousness but never discussing the respondent’s conduct while confined).
249. Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 594.
250. United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 168–69 (4th Cir. 2014).
251. Nancy Wolff et al., Sexual Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of Victimization, 85 J. URB. HEALTH
835, 835 (2006).
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 96, at 136.
254. Risk Assessment, supra note 107.
255. Baldwin, supra note 96, at 136–37 (discussing unstructured clinical judgment as the first
generation of sexual offender assessment methodology and describing advancements in expert
reporting).
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Modern assessments rely on multiple actuarial instruments in addition to
relevant factors not captured in actuarial instruments.256 Some experts explain
that certain acts while confined demonstrate an increased propensity to have
serious difficulty refraining, such as alcohol use while incarcerated.257
Nonetheless, conduct while confined cannot ethically be used exclusively to
harm a respondent’s case yet never assist someone in demonstrating that they
would not have serious difficulty refraining from reoffending. As best stated by
the Schmidt court, “Time passes. Respondent’s volitional control as it is now is
the subject of this inquiry, not his posture in 1985. . . . The recent years, in
which respondent has shown volitional control, even in prison, are evidence in
his favor.”258
B.

Dynamic Factors and Combining Static and Dynamic Instruments

Courts’ desire to assign concrete numeric values to dangerousness is
understandable given how complex the analysis of “serious difficulty refraining”
from reoffense can be. Indeed, the Static-99R can serve as a good baseline.
Studies show predictive accuracy increases when the Static-99R is combined
with other instruments as opposed to a single test.259 For example, the Sexual
Offender Treatment Intervention and Progress Scale (“SOTIPS”), when
combined with the Static-99R, increased predictive accuracy up to 0.89, with
significant prediction of recidivism in all six categories of risk—something the
Static-99R alone cannot claim.260 Because these dynamic assessments
incorporate questions that speak to volitional ability, they can speak much more
clearly to the question the statute asks than the Static-99R alone.261 They cover
categories such as emotional regulation,262 risk management,263 and
impulsivity.264
Furthermore, new research indicates that simply knowing a risk of
recidivism is not nearly as important as knowing which personality traits highly
influence that individual’s actions. Researchers recently found that knowing the
underlying reason for the acts captured in actuarial instruments was more
256. See United States v. Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d 586, 593 (E.D.N.C. 2018).
257. United States v. Montgomery, 310 F. Supp. 3d 637, 641–44 (E.D.N.C. 2018) (discussing
whether substance abuse while confined can be a serious mental disorder that would demonstrate
ongoing dangerousness).
258. Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 594.
259. McGrath et al., supra note 121, at 443–53.
260. Id.
261. See generally ROBERT J. MCGRATH, GEORGIA F. CUMMING & MICHAEL P. LASHER, SEX
OFFENDER TREATMENT INTERVENTION AND PROGRESS SCALE 6–37 (2013),
https://www.csom.org/pubs/SOTIPSMANUALOctober2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5SAL-XEZL]
(describing each scoring criterial in detail).
262. Id. at 26–27.
263. Id. at 14–15.
264. Id. at 30–31.
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important than just knowing their overall score265: “[K]nowing that an offender
scored moderately on the Static-99R is not as useful as knowing that this
offender scored highly on Persistence/Paraphilia and low on General
Criminality and Youthful Stranger Aggression. For this specific offender,
treatment providers might de-emphasize anger management treatment
programs and emphasize self-regulation of paraphilic interests.”266 The most
useful information comes from “explain[ing] the source of the risk.”267
Given that civil commitment is intended to provide treatment for mental
health conditions, the evidence used to determine dangerousness should match
the criteria that is known to reduce risk.268 Addressing dynamic factors in
treatment has been scientifically shown to reduce risk of reoffense.269 Critics
may argue that the science is young on such incorporated lesser-studied factors,
but recent reports indicate the field of sexual offender recidivism analysis is
moving towards this hybrid approach.270 Court decisions also mirror this trend,
acknowledging that individuals may legitimately change over the course of
lengthy sentences and treatment interventions.271 With the possibility of
lifelong incarceration on the table, even an incremental improvement in
predictive validity should be enough to require the use of a more accurate
methodology to assess an individual’s dangerousness.
CONCLUSION
The safety of the public is the utmost priority. Civil commitment through
the AWA is the mechanism Congress has chosen in order to ensure the public’s
safety from sexual offenders. Courts have a difficult task to ensure public safety
while not violating the liberty interests of an offender. As it stands, one of the
primary pieces of evidence used in civil commitment hearings is the Static-99R,
which has low predictive accuracy, is commonly misunderstood, and gauges
only a likelihood of recidivism. To use such an instrument when the Act
explicitly calls for a determination that an offender would have serious difficulty
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation, combined with the high
burden of proof, is both unethical and unconstitutional. Viable alternatives exist
to demonstrate sexual dangerousness, but because the Static-99R has not been
265. Sébastien Brouillette-Alarie, Jean Proulx & R. Karl Hanson, Three Central Dimensions of Sexual
Recidivism Risk: Understanding the Latent Constructs of Static-99R and Static-2002R, 30 SEXUAL ABUSE
676, 694–95 (2018).
266. Id. at 695.
267. Ruth E. Mann, R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Assessing Risk for Sexual Recidivism: Some
Proposals on the Nature of Psychologically Meaningful Risk Factors, 22 SEXUAL ABUSE 191, 191 (2010)
(emphasis omitted).
268. Baldwin, supra note 96, at 136.
269. Yates, supra note 242, at 93.
270. Baldwin, supra note 96, at 133.
271. United States v. Schmidt, 295 F. Supp. 3d 586, 593–94 (E.D.N.C. 2018).
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convincingly challenged in court, it remains the most prevalent instrument in
use. By combining dynamic instruments and valuing a sexual offender’s
progress while confined, courts can both uphold public safety while valuing the
constitutional liberty interests of respondents who are held past the completion
of their criminal sentence.
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